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Abstract Climate change must deal with two market failures: global warming and learning
by doing in renewable energy production. The first-best policy consists of an aggressive
renewables subsidy in the near term and a gradually rising and falling carbon tax. Given
that global carbon taxes remain elusive, policy makers might have to rely on a second-best
subsidy only. With credible commitment the second-best subsidy is higher than the social
benefit of learning to cut the transition time and peak warming close to first-best levels at the
cost of higher fossil fuel use in the short run (weak Green Paradox). Without commitment the
second-best subsidy is set to the social benefit of learning. It generates smaller weak Green
Paradox effects, but the transition to the carbon-free takes longer and cumulative carbon
emissions are higher. Under first best and second best with pre-commitment peak warming
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is 2.1–2.3 ◦C, under second best without commitment 3.5 ◦C, and without any policy 5.1 ◦C
above pre-industrial levels. Not being able to commit yields a welfare loss of 95% of initial
GDP compared to first best. Being able to commit brings this figure down to 7%.
Keywords First best · Second best · Commitment · Markov-perfect · Ramsey growth ·
Carbon tax · Renewables subsidy · Learning by doing · Directed technical change
JEL Classification H21 · Q51 · Q54
1 Introduction
Climate policy has to deal with two crucial market failures: the failure for markets to price
carbon to fully internalize all future damages arising from burning another unit of carbon
today (e.g., Nordhaus 2008; Stern 2013) and the failure of markets to internalize the full
benefits of learning by doing in the production of renewable energy (e.g., Goulder andMathai
2000; De Zwaan et al. 2002; Popp 2004; Edenhofer et al. 2005). To correct for these market
failures the first-best policy has to be two-pronged: a carbon tax that must be set to the social
cost of carbon (SCC) which equals the present value of all future marginal global warming
damages resulting from burning one extra unit carbon today,1 and a renewable subsidy that
must be set to the social benefit of learning by doing (SBL) which equals the present value
of all future reductions in the cost of renewables from using one unit of renewable energy
today. Politicians are, however, keener on the carrot than the stick and thus prefer subsidies
to taxes. Thirty years of international climate negotiations have failed miserably and national
renewable policies may be called for when agreements on international carbon taxation fail to
materialize. This brings us in the realm of second-best economics. Our objective is, therefore,
to investigate how well a second-best Markov-perfect optimal subsidy for renewable energy
production2 performs in the absence of a carbon tax in the decentralized market economy
compared with the first-best climate policy and business as usual.
Second-best issues are omnipresent in public economics but rarely discussed in climate
change economics.3 Grimaud et al. (2011) analyse optimal first-best and second-best climate
policies in a decentralized market economy with directed technical change and endogenous
growth. Kalkuhl et al. (2013) use a sophisticated IAM of growth and climate change with
stock-dependent fossil fuel extraction costs to investigate the impact of optimal second-best
renewable energy subsidies when carbon taxation is infeasible in a decentralized market
1 The optimal carbon price can be found on an efficient emissions market or as the shadow price of direct
control legislation, but here we will refer to the carbon tax for sake of concreteness. Fischer et al. (2003)
discusses effects of endogenous technical change on instrument choice.
2 In designing such a subsidy policy makers have to ensure that it is generic to avoid picking winners as
policy makers have no particular ability to successfully pick the right renewable energy firm or technology
to subsidize. It is thus important to have a broad market-based approach for stimulating the whole renewable
energy industry (e.g., via tax deductions for all renewable energy producers).
3 The voluminous literature on the double dividend hypothesis surveyed by Bovenberg and Goulder (2002)
deals with static second-best issues. The exceptions are Barrage (2014) and Schmitt (2013) who discuss
optimal climate policy with distortionary labour and capital income taxation, respectively, with and without
commitment. van der Ploeg (2016) discusses the theory of second-best optimal carbon taxation in a two-period,
three-country framework, highlights the rent grabbing component of the unilateral carbon tax and shows that
the second-best optimal future carbon tax given a first-best carbon tax that is set below the optimal social cost
of carbon to mitigate weak Green Paradox effects.
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economy.4 These studies find that a second-best subsidy is an apt measure for compensating
the missing carbon price but assume that policy makers can commit to announcements about
future policies even though given the forward-looking nature of scarcity rents on fossil fuel
there is an incentive to re-optimize and deviate from announcements about future policies.We
therefore study the time-consistent Markov perfect second-best optimal policy and find that
the loss of commitment has significant costs in terms of welfare and environmental damage.
We characterize the equilibrium conditions for the first-best and second-best policy in an
integrated assessment model (IAM) of growth and climate change with stock-dependent
extraction costs, ongoing technical progress, and structural change.We assume that renewable
energy is a perfect substitute for fossil fuel.5 This implies that there are discrete phases of
energy use, which allow us to calculate the optimal second-best policies with and without
commitment in a relatively straightforwardway.We also assume that fossil fuel is exhaustible.
The price of fossil fuel thus contains two forward-looking elements: the scarcity rent (the
present discounted value of all future increases in extraction costs resulting from an extracting
an extra unit of fossil fuel) and the carbon tax. The endogenous scarcity rent responds to
expectations about future policy and in particular falls in response to expectations of future
subsidies for renewable energy production. In the absence of a carbon tax, market prices
for fossil fuel thus fall in this second-best setting, leading to increased carbon emissions
relative to business as usual which has been coined a weak Green Paradox (Sinn 2008;
Gerlagh 2011). The second-best Markov-perfect climate policy assumes, in contrast, that
policy makers cannot commit to announced future renewable subsidies and therefore is set
to the social benefit of learning. If commitment is credible, policy makers can improve on
theMarkov-perfect second-best optimal renewable subsidy by pushing the subsidy above the
SBL, thereby compensating for the lack of a carbon tax. It brings forward extraction of fossil
4 Kalkuhl et al. (2013) maximize welfare under the additional constraint of a peak warming of 2 ◦C and the
associated cumulative carbon budget for the optimal first-best or second-best climate policies. In our framework
policy has to trade off small reductions in future global warming against small reductions in consumption now.
The resultingmaximumdegree of globalwarmingdepends on the rate of pure timepreference, intergenerational
inequality aversion and trend growth, and is thus not necessarily equal to 2 ◦C. In contrast to Kalkuhl et al.
(2013), we find that the optimal second-best renewable subsidy is able to lock up a large fraction of fossil fuel
reserves and thus despite some short-run adverse weak Green Paradox effects boosts welfare and gets close
to the first-best optimum.
5 We suppose that the cost of renewable energy falls as experience increases (Arrow 1962). Tiang and Popp
(2014) provide recent econometric evidence for significant learning-by-doing effects in renewable energy
generation, which suggests that each new wind power project in China (with 60 GW capacity) leads to a unit
cost reduction of 0.25%. De Zwaan et al. (2002) are the first to address optimal climate policy in the face of
learning by doing in renewables in integrated assessment models. Popp (2004) studies endogenous technical
progress in a fully calibrated IAM, Popp et al. (2010) review the implications of technical innovation and
diffusion for the environment, and Goulder and Mathai (2000) study the implications in a stylized model of
climate change. Manne and Richels (2004) argue that endogenous technical progress does not alter climate
policy recommendations, specifically the transition timing. Jouvet and Schumacher (2012) find the opposite
and so does Popp (2004) who studies optimal policies in an adapted version of DICE of Nordhaus (2008).
Hübler et al. (2012) present a multi-region IAM with endogenous growth and study region-specific welfare
effects. Fischer and Newell (2008) study optimal interaction of policy instruments in a calibrated model of
heterogeneous energy producers limited to the US energy sector. None of these studies considers the “laissez
faire” decentralized economy. Grimaud et al. (2001) characterize the “laissez faire” equilibrium in a stylized
model. Various studies examine second-best carbon tax policy when not enough instruments are available to
the government (Hart 2008; Graeker and Pade 2009). Second-best subsidies have been studied using large,
numerical global energy models (Edenhofer et al. 2005; Bosetti et al. 2006). Fossil fuel stocks are assumed
abundant. Thus these studies cannot address how much fossil fuel to lock up in the crust of the earth and the
time of phasing in renewables does not depend on expectations about future policies and energy prices. These
are crucial features of our analysis. Tsur and Zemel (2005) analyze growth and R&D in a model with scarce
resources, but do not offer a calibration and figures for optimal climate policy.
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fuel at the cost of accelerated global warming in the short run, because fossil fuel owners
fear that their resources will be worth less in the future. However, compared with business
as usual, either second-best policy locks up more fossil fuel in the ground and curbs global
warming in the long run but less so than in the first best. Our second-best Markov-perfect
framework allows to investigate whether the extra fossil fuel that is locked up forever is big
enough to avoid a strong Green Paradox (Gerlagh 2011).
Our calibrated IAM suggests that the first-best climate policy requires an aggressive and
temporary renewable subsidy for the next few decades and a gradually rising carbon tax to
price out fossil fuel with the required carbon tax to keep out fossil fuel in the carbon-free era,
eventually fallingwith time.Given our specification of globalwarming damages, the first-best
climate policy enforces a carbon budget of 320 GtC and brings down the maximum global
mean temperature to 2.1 ◦C.With commitment the second-best subsidy for renewable energy
fully compensates for the missing carbon tax such that the transition to carbon-free energy
coincides with first-best. The lacking carbon tax, however, induces higher fossil fuel of 60
GtC during the fossil era and thus peak warming increases somewhat to 2.3 ◦C. The second-
bestMarkov-perfect renewable subsidy is relevant in the more realistic case that commitment
is infeasible and uses a significantly higher carbon budget of 1080 GtC, which implies much
higher peak warming of 3.5 ◦C. This compares to a business as usual outcome of 2500 GtC
carbon burnt and pre-industrial temperature increases of 5.1 ◦C. There is no strong Green
Paradox as the Markov Perfect second-best renewable subsidy without commitment reduces
social welfare relative to under first best by 95% of initial GDP compared to a welfare loss of
six times initial GDP under business as usual. Being able to commit brings this figure down
to 7%. However, policy makers have an incentive to renege after some time has lapsed by
increasing the renewable subsidy and bringing forward the carbon-free era even more and
locking up even more carbon in the crust of the earth.
Section 2 discusses a simple two-stock model of carbon accumulation in the atmosphere
and global mean temperature due to Golosov et al. (2014) and discusses our benchmark
specification of climate damages which are bigger at higher temperatures than Nordhaus
(2008, 2014) following recent suggestions by Stern (2013) and Dietz and Stern (2014).
Section 3 formulates the command optimum for our general equilibrium IAM of climate
change andRamsey growth. Section 4 derives themarket outcome of our IAMand shows how
to derive the optimal first-best and second-best Markov-perfect climate policies. Section 5
offers policy simulations and highlights the effects of first-best and second-best Markov-
perfect climate policies on untapped fossil fuel, the time it takes to phase in renewable energy
and to reach the carbon-free era, and welfare. There is also a discussion of the second-best
optimal policy if pre-commitment is feasible. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Carbon Cycle, Temperature and Global Warming Damages
We use an annual version of the decadal model of the linear carbon cycle put forward by
Golosov et al. (2014) and based on Archer (2005) and Archer et al. (2009):
E Pt+1 = E Pt + ϕL Ft , ϕL = 0.2, E P0 = 103GtC, (1)
ETt+1 = (1 − ϕ)ETt + ϕ0(1 − ϕL)Ft , ϕ = 0.002304, ϕ0 = 0.393, ET0 = 699GtC,
(2)
where E Pt is the part of the stock of carbon (GtC) that stays thousands of years in the
atmosphere,ETt the remaining part of the stock of atmospheric carbon (GtC) that decays at
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rateϕ, and Ft the rate of fossil fuel use (GtC/decade).6 About 20%of carbon emissions stay up
‘forever’ and the remainder has amean life of about 300 years, so ϕ = 1−(1−0.0228)1/10 =
0.002304, where 0.0228 is the parameter proposed for the decadal model in Golosov et al.
(2014). The parameter ϕ0 = 0.393, is calibrated so that about half the carbon impulse is
removed after 30 years.
The equilibrium climate sensitivity, ω, is the rise in peak global mean temperature after a
doubling of the total carbon stock in the atmosphere, Et . A typical estimate for ω is 3 (IPCC
2007). Following Golosov et al. (2014), we ignore lags between atmospheric carbon and
temperature:
Tt = ω ln (Et/596.4) / ln(2), ω = 3, Et ≡ E Pt + ETt , (3)
where 596.4 GtC is the IPCC figure for the pre-industrial carbon stock.7 The evolution of
fossil fuel reserves St (measured at the start of period t) follows from the depletion equation:
St+1 = St − Ft , S0 = 4000GtC. (4)
Nordhaus (2008) combines detailed micro estimates of costs of global warming to get aggre-
gate macro costs of 1.7% of world GDP at 2.5 ◦C. This figure is used to calibrate the fraction
of production that is left after global warming damages:
Z˜(Tt ) = 1
1 + ζ1T ζ2t + ζ3T ζ4t
, so Z(Et ) ≡ Z˜ (ω ln (Et/596.4) / ln(2)) , (5)
with ζ1= 0.00284, ζ2= 2, and ζ3 = ζ4= 0.8 Weitzman (2010) and Dietz and Stern (2014)
argue that damages rise more rapidly at higher levels of temperature than suggested by (5).
Assuming that damages are 50% of world GDP at 6o C and 99% at 12.5 ◦C, Ackerman and
Stanton (2012) recalibrate (5) with ζ1= 0.00245, ζ2= 2, ζ3 = 5.021 × 10−6, and ζ4= 6.76.
The extra term in the denominator is included to capture potentially catastrophic losses at
high temperatures.9
3 Ramsey Growth and Climate Change: The Command Optimum
The social planner maximizes utilitarian social welfare
∞∑
t=0
(1 + ρ)−t LtUt (Ct/Lt ) =
∞∑
t=0
(1 + ρ)−t Lt
[
(Ct/Lt )1−1/η − 1
1 − 1/η
]
, (6)
where Lt is the size of the exogenous world population at time t , Ct aggregate consumption
at time t, U the instantaneous CES utility function, ρ > 0 the rate of pure time preference
and η > 0 the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. The ethics of climate policy depend on
6 The three reservoirs used by Nordhaus (2008) highlight the exchange of carbon with the deep oceans,
which arise from the acidification of oceans limiting the capacity to absorb carbon. Our carbon cycle ignores
time-varying coefficients as in Bolin and Erikkson (1958). It also abstracts from diffusive rather than advective
transfers of heat to the oceans (Allen et al. 2009) which leads to longer and greater warming (Bronselaer et al.
2013; Baldwin 2014).
7 This temperature lag lowers the SCC (Rezai and Van der Ploeg 2016).
8 The damage function resulting from the DICE-07 model is almost distinguishable (up to 7 oC) from that of
the DICE-2013R model (see http://www.econ.yale.edu/~nordhaus/homepage/Web-DICE-2013-April.htm).
9 We abstract from positive feedback and uncertain climate catastrophes (e.g., Lemoine and Traeger 2014;
Lontzek et al. 2015; van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw 2013).
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how much weight is given to future generations and how small intergenerational inequality
aversion (IIA = 1/η) is or how easy it is to substitute current for future consumption per head.
The most ambitious climate policies result on a growth path, if society has a low rate of time
preference and a low IIA (low ρ, high η).
Output is producedwith capital Kt , labour, Lt , and energy. Energy is either renewable Rt (e.g.,
solar or wind energy) or fossil fuel (oil, natural gas and coal) Ft . The production function H (.)
has constant returns to scale, is concave, and satisfies the Inada conditions. Renewables are
subject to learning, so their unit production cost b(Bt ) falls with cumulated past production
Bt and thus b′ < 0. Fossil fuel extraction cost is G(St )Ft with St remaining reserves, and rise
as less accessible fields have to be explored, G ′ < 0. What is left of production after covering
the cost of energy is allocated to consumption Ct , investments Kt+1 − Kt , and depreciation
δKtwhere δ is the depreciation rate:
Kt+1 = (1 − δ)Kt + Z(Et )H(Kt , Lt , Ft + Rt ) − G(St )Ft − b(Bt )Rt − Ct . (7)
The initial capital stock K0 is given. Renewable knowledge accumulates according to
Bt+1 = Bt + Rt , B0 = 0. (8)
Current technological options favour fossil energy. Complete decarbonization requires sub-
stantial reductions in the cost of renewables versus that of fossil fuel. Apart from carbon
taxes, technological progress is an important factor in determining the optimal combination
of fossil and renewable energy sources (Acemoglu et al. 2012;Mattauch et al. 2012).We thus
capture learning and lock-in effects by making the cost of renewables a decreasing function
of past cumulated renewable energy production, b′ < 0 with Bt = ∑ts=0 Rs . We assume
instantaneous and perfect spill-over of learning from one producer to all others.10
Proposition 1 The social optimum maximizes (6) subject to (1–8). It must satisfy the Euler
equation for consumption growth
Ct+1/Lt+1
Ct/Lt
=
(
1 + rt+1
1 + ρ
)η
, rt+1 ≡ Zt+1HKt+1 − δ, (9)
and the efficiency conditions for energy use
Z(Et )HFt +Rt (Kt , Lt , Ft + Rt ) ≤ G(St ) + θ St + θ Et , Ft ≥ 0, c.s., (10a)
Z(Et )HFt +Rt (Kt , Lt , Ft + Rt ) ≤ b(Bt ) − θ Bt , Rt ≥ 0, c.s., (10b)
where the scarcity rent, the SCC and the SBL are, respectively, given by
θ St = −
∞∑
s=0
[
G ′(St+1+s)Ft+1+s	t+s
]
, (11)
θ Bt = −
∞∑
s=0
[
b′(Bt+1+s)Rt+1+s	t+s
]
and (12)
θ Et = −
∞∑
s=0
[{
ϕL + ϕ0(1 − ϕL)(1 − ϕ)s
}
	t+s Z ′(Et+1+s)H(Kt+1+s, Lt+1+s, Ft+1+s + Rt+1+s)
]
, (13)
10 We prefer learning-by-doing over other specifications of endogenous technical change, such as investment
in R&D in Bovenberg and Goulder (1996) and Acemoglu et al. (2012), due to the better, albeit limited,
availability of empirically validated learning curves. See also footnote 5.
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with the compound discount factors given by 	t+s ≡ ∏ss′=0 (1 + rt+1+s′)−1, s ≥ 0.
Proof see Appendix A.
The Euler Eq. (9) states that growth in consumption per capita rises with the social return
on capital (rt+1) and falls with the rate of time preference, especially if IIA = 1/η is small.
Equation (10a) states that, if fossil fuel is used, its marginal product should equal the sum
of current extraction cost, G(St ), the scarcity rent, θ St , and the SCC, θ
E
t . If fossil fuel is not
used, its marginal product is below marginal cost. Equation (10b) indicates that, if renewable
energy is used, its marginal product must equal its current cost b(Bt ) minus the SBL, θ Bt .
Equation (11) corresponds to the Hotelling rule which states that the return on extracting
an extra unit of fossil, i.e., the rate of interest (rtθ St ) minus the increase in future extraction
cost
(−G ′(St+1)Ft+1
)
, must equal the expected capital gain from keeping an extra unit of
fossil fuel in the earth (θ St+1 − θ St ). Due to the availability of renewable energy as a backstop,
increasing extraction costs imply that fossil fuel will be eventually phased out completely
so that typically part of fossil fuel reserves will be abandoned and locked up. The Hotelling
scarcity rent then captures the increase in all future extraction costs resulting from extracting
an extra unit of fossil fuel today. Equation (12) indicates that the SBL equals the present
discounted value of all future learning-by-doing reductions in the cost of renewable energy
resulting from using one more unit of renewable energy today.
Equation (13) states that the SCC equals the present discounted value of all future marginal
global warming damages from burning one unit of carbon today, taking due account of part
staying in the atmosphere forever and the rest gradually decaying at a rate of roughly 1/300
per year. A special case of our IAM yields the following simple rule for the SCC. unionsq
Proposition 2 If the utility function is logarithmic (IIA = 1), the production function is
Cobb-Douglas, global warming damages are Z(Et ) ∼= exp
[
−ζ˜ (Et − 581)
]
: depreciation
of physical capital is 100% every period and energy production does not require capital
input, the SCC becomes
θ Et = ζ˜
[(
1 + ρ
ρ
)
ϕL +
(
1 + ρ
ρ + ϕ
)
ϕ0(1 − ϕL)
]
Z(Et )H(Kt , Lt , Ft + Rt ). (13′)
Proof see Golosov et al. (2014).
The simple rule (13′) states that the optimal SCC is proportional to world GDP. The factor
of proportionality is independent of the factor production shares; it is big if society is patient
(ρ small), the permanent fraction of the atmospheric stock of carbon ϕL is large, and the
lifetime of the transient component of the atmospheric stock of carbon 1/ ϕ is large.11 unionsq
4 Ramsey Growth and Climate Change: The Decentralized Market
Outcome
In a decentralized market economy one needs to consider the behaviour of producers of
final goods, fossil fuel and renewable energy and that of households. Final goods producers
operate under perfect competition. They take the output price (the numeraire), the wage wt ,
11 Nordhaus (1991) and Golosov et al. (2014) also give approximate rules for the optimal SCC, which depend
on IIA and the trend rate of growth of the economy. Rezai and Van der Ploeg (2016) derive an approximate
rule for the optimal SCC which also allows for population growth, climate damages not proportional to GDP,
and mean reversion in damages to TFP growth and show that it performs very well.
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the market interest rate rt+1, the market price for fossil fuel pt , the specific carbon tax τt ,
the market price for renewable energy qt , the renewable subsidy υt and the carbon stock Et
as given. They choose labour, capital and energy to maximize profits, Z(Et )H(.) − wt Lt −
(rt+1 + δ)Kt − (pt + τt )Ft − (qt − υt )Rt , where rt+1 + δ is the user cost of capital. This
leads to the following efficiency conditions:
Z(Et )HKt = rt+1 + δ, Z(Et )HLt = wt ,
Z(Et )HFt ≤ pt + τt
Ft ≥ 0
}
c.s.,
Z(Et )HRt ≤ qt − υt
Rt ≥ 0
}
c.s. (14)
Making use of (14), we obtain the net output function
Yt ≡ Z(Et )H(.) − δKt − (pt + τt )Ft − (qt − υt )Rt = Y (Et , Kt , Lt , pt + τt , qt − υt ),
(15)
where YEt = Z(Et )′Ht < 0, YKt = rt+1, YLt = wt , Ypt +τt = −Ft ≤ 0 and Yqt −υt =
−Rt ≤ 0.
Fossil fuel owners also operate under perfect competition and maximize the present dis-
counted value of their profits,
∑∞
t=0 	˜t [pt Ft − G(St )Ft ] with 	˜t ≡
∏t
s=0 (1 + r1+s)−1,
t ≥ 0, subject to the depletion Eq. (4), taking the market price of fossil fuel pt as given and
internalizing the adverse effect of current depletion on future extraction costs. They thus set
the price of fossil fuel equal to extraction cost plus the scarcity rent (11) which stems from
the Hotelling rule:
pt = G(St ) + θ St where θ St+1 = (1 + rt+1)θ St + G ′(St+1)Ft+1. (16)
Producers of renewable energy also operate under perfect competition and maximize the
present value of their profits,
∑∞
t=0 	˜t [{qt − b(Bt )} Rt ], taking themarket price of renewable
energy qt and the stock of accumulated knowledge about using renewable energy Bt as
given. They thus set the price of renewable energy equal to the marginal cost of producing
it: qt = b(Bt ).
Households maximize utility (6) subject to the budget constraint AHt+1 = (1 + rt+1)AHt +
wt Lt + t − Ct , where AHt denotes household assets and t lump-sum transfers from the
government. This gives rise to the same Euler equation for optimal consumption growth as
in the command economy, (9).
The government balances its books, τt Ft = υt Rt +t , so that it hands net revenue from taxes
and subsidies as lump-sum transfers. Asset and final goods market equilibrium require AHt =
Kt andZ(Et )H(.) = Ct +Kt+1−(1−δ)Kt +G(St )Ft +b(Bt )Rt .Using (15) and the pricing
conditions for energy producers, the latter becomes Kt+1 = Kt +Yt −Ct +(θ St +τt )Ft −υt Rt .
4.1 Replicating the First-Best Optimum in the Market Economy
The first fundamental theorem of welfare economics indicates that the first-best optimum for
the command economy can, with suitable taxes and subsidies, be replicated in the market
economy.
Proposition 3 The social optimum is replicated in the decentralized market economy if
τt = θ Et and νt = θ Bt , ∀t ≥ 0,where these follow from (12) and (13).
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Proof Comparing conditions of Proposition 2 with the efficiency conditions and market
equilibrium conditions of the decentralized market economy, we can demonstrate that these
are identical if the specific carbon tax is set to the first-best SCC and the renewable subsidy
is set to the optimal SBL. unionsq
The first best thus emerges in the market economy if the specific carbon tax is set to the
optimal SCC, the renewable subsidy is set to the optimal SBL, and net revenue is rebated in
lump sums. There are also other ways of decentralizing the social optimum. For example, a
global competitive emissions market will end up with a carbon price equal to the first-best
SCC too.
4.2 Second-Best Climate Policies in the Market Economy: With and Without
Commitment
As shown in Grimaud et al. (2011) and Kalkuhl et al. (2013), calculating second-best climate
policies is more cumbersome. The reason is that the first fundamental theorem of welfare
economic no longer holds if the full set of instruments is no longer available. This occurs
if the government optimally chooses the renewable subsidy, but the carbon tax is absent
(or constrained to a sub-optimal value). In this case, the renewable subsidy is set to max-
imize welfare subject to the behavioural, market equilibrium and budget constraints of the
market economy as described in Sect. 4.1. Making use of the net output function (15), the
government’s second-best problem can thus be stated as:
Max{υt , t≥0}
∞∑
t=0
(1 + ρ)−t Lt
[
(Ct/Lt )1−1/η − 1
1 − 1/η
]
, (17)
subject to the constraints
E Pt+1 = E Pt + ϕLMax
[
0,−Ypt (Et , Kt , Lt , pt , qt − υt )
]
, E P0 given, (18a)
ETt+1 = (1 − ϕ)ETt +ϕ0(1 − ϕL)Max
[
0,−Ypt (Et , Kt , Lt , pt , qt − υt )
]
, ET0 given,
(18b)
St+1 = St − Max
[
0,−Ypt (Et , Kt , Lt , pt , qt − υt )
]
, S0 given, (18c)
Bt+1 = Bt + Max
[
0,−Yqt −υt (Et , Kt , Lt , pt , qt − υt )
]
, B0 = 0. (18d)
Kt+1 = Kt + Y (Et , Kt , Lt , pt , qt − υt ) − Ct +θ St Max
[
0,−Ypt (Et , Kt , Lt , pt , qt − υt )
]
−υtMax
[
0,−Yqt −υt (Et , Kt , Lt , pt , qt − υt )
]
, (18e)
Ct+1 =
(
1 + YKt (Et , Kt , Lt , pt , qt − υt )
1 + ρ
)η ( Lt+1
Lt
)
Ct , and (19a)
θ St+1 =
[
1 + YKt (Et , Kt , Lt , pt , qt − υt )
]
θ St +
G ′(St+1)Max
[
0,−Ypt+1(Et+1, Kt+1, Lt+1, pt+1, qt+1 − υt+1)
]
. (19b)
where pt = G(St )+θ St and qt = b(Bt ).Equation (17) is the same objective as in (6) but with
a different choice set. Equations (18a), (18b) and (18c) restate Eqs. (1), (2) and (4) with fossil
fuel use substituted from the net output function (15). Equation (18d) describes the evolution
of knowledge in producing renewable energy and stems from (6) and (15). Equation (18e)
is the goods market equilibrium condition using (15). Equations (18a–e) give the dynamics
for the predetermined state variables of our IAM. The dynamics for the non-predetermined
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states are given by the Euler equation for consumption (19a), which is derived from (9), and
(19b) the Hotelling rule (19b) for the scarcity rent, which stems from (16), where the interest
rate and fossil fuel use come from the net output function.
Given that empirically the cost of renewable energy is currently above that of fossil fuels,
the second-best optimal outcome with pre-commitment for the market economy that results
from the optimal control problem (17–19) consists of an initial phase where only fossil
fuel is used, possibly an intermediate phase where fossil fuel and renewable energy use are
alongside each other,12 and a final carbon-free phase. The renewable subsidy is only defined
and effective during the intermediate and final renewable phase. The policy maker can bring
forward the transition time to the carbon-free era by setting higher subsidy levels than the
SBL, and thereby getting closer to the first best.
Such strategic considerations are not feasible for the policy maker without commitment:
the Markov-perfect second-best policy therefore equals the SBL and does not attempt to
manipulate the optimal time of transition to the carbon-free era. To see this, one has to solve
the problem (17–19) using the principle of dynamic programming. Starting with the final
phase, we note that the in-situ stock of fossil fuel remains unchanged whilst the carbon in
the atmosphere gradually decays leaving ultimately only the permanent component. Since
we have Z(Et )HRt = b(Bt )−υt , renewable use increases in capital, the stock of renewable
knowledge and the renewable subsidy but falls with global warming. Working backwards in
accordance with the principle of dynamic programming, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 4 During the final carbon-free phase and the phase where fossil fuel and renew-
able energy are used together, the Markov-perfect second-best optimal renewable subsidy
equals the SBL:
υt = θ Bt = −
∞∑
s=0
[
b′(Bt+1+s)Rt+1+s	t+s
]
. (20)
Proof See Appendix B.
The Markov-perfect second-best optimal renewable subsidy equals the second-best SBL,
but this does not necessarily coincide with the first-best optimal SBL and renewable subsidy.
To see this, note that the first phase where only fossil fuel is used has no policies and can
be solved as if it were business as usual. Still, the outcomes during this first fossil-fuel-only
phase are not business as usual for two reasons. First, the renewable subsidy with and without
commitment ensures thatmore fossil fuel is locked up forever. This follows from the arbitrage
condition that at the end of phase one (supposing that the intermediate phase is degenerate
for the time being) the economy must be indifferent between using fossil fuel in final goods
production and renewable energy and from a vanishing scarcity rent at that time:
G(St ) < b(0) − υt , 0 ≤ t < tC F , G(St ) ≥ b(Bt ) − υt , St = StC F , ∀t ≥ tC F ,
(21)
where tC F is the time when the economy for the first time uses only renewable energy.
From (21) we see that a renewable subsidy increases the stock of untapped fossil fuel and
thus curbs the length of the first phase. Second, the renewable subsidy lowers fossil fuel
12 Since fossil fuel and renewable energy are perfect substitutes, simultaneous use is infeasible without
learning by doing, renewable subsidy or carbon tax (except possibly for a single period of time). Learning by
doing introduces convexity in the renewable production cost so an intermediate phase with simultaneous use
might emerge. In fact, such a phase typically does not occur in our simulations and if it does occur it is at most
for one or a few years.
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prices in the first phase and thus induces a weak Green Paradox as at any point of time
carbon emissions are higher than under business as usual. A renewable subsidy thus curbs
cumulative carbon emissions but boosts emissions in the short run.
At the time of the switch to the final carbon-free phase, the energy price must be continuous
to rule out unexploited arbitrage opportunities. Hence, renewable energy use immediately
after time tC F must equal fossil fuel use immediately before time tC F , and thus is higher due
to weak Green Paradox effects in the initial phase. The second-best optimal social benefit
of learning by doing (20) must thus at time tC F and thereafter be higher than the first-best
optimal SBL. In this sense the second-best optimal subsidy over-compensates for the lack
of a carbon tax. The extent to which it is higher depends on the trade-off between adverse
short-run weak Green Paradox effects and long-run benefits of locking up carbon. Hence,
the upward adjustment of the SBL is less if fossil fuel demand is relatively elastic and fossil
fuel supply is relatively inelastic.13 unionsq
4.3 Announcement of Future Second-Best Optimal Climate Policies
As already mentioned, if policy makers can commit to announcements about the future
renewable subsidy, they can boost welfare by pushing the renewable subsidy above the SBL
and thereby bringing forward the carbon-free era, locking up more fossil fuel, and curbing
cumulative carbon emissions. However, as is well known from the macroeconomic literature
on time inconsistency (e.g., Kydland and Prescott 1977; Barro and Gordon 1983), such a
policy—also called the rules outcome—is time inconsistent and not credible.14 As after
some time there is less fossil fuel in situ, weak Green Paradox effects are less after some
time. Re-optimization would then lead to an upward adjustment of the renewable subsidy. As
a result, the phasing out of fossil fuel will be brought forward and less fossil fuel reserves will
be burnt leading to lower cumulative carbon emissions and lower peak global warming, but
transitory Green Paradox effects will be stronger. In our simulations we contrast the second-
best renewable policy with and without commitment, also called the rules and discretionary
outcomes following Kydland and Prescott (1977), and highlight the cost of not being able to
commit. We also show that welfare rises if policy makers renege on the former outcome just
before the fossil fuel was meant to be phased out.
5 Policy Simulation and Optimization
Here we compare the scenarios for themarket economy summarized in Fig. 1 and Tables 3–4:
I. the first-best outcome where the carbon tax is set to the optimal SCC, τt = θ Et , and the
renewable subsidy is set to the optimal SBL, υt = θ Bt , ∀t ≥ 0 (solid lines);
II. the second-best renewable subsidy without commitment, also called the discretionary
outcome(long-dashed lines);
13 One can also calculate the second-best carbon tax in the absence of a renewable subsidy. The derivation
is similar and the global second-best carbon tax will be set to the SCC, where the SCC will differ due to the
initial phase being longer and the in-situ stock of fossil fuel at the end of the initial phase being lower. With
commitment the second-best carbon tax compensates for the lack of a renewable subsidy. Due to its political
irrelevance, we do not study the second-best carbon tax further.
14 The co-statesμCt andμ
S
t for the non-predetermined variables driven by (19) are predetermined. Optimality
requires thatμC0 = 0 andμS0 = 0. The second-best optimal subsidy is time consistent if these co-states remain
zero forever. If not, it is time inconsistent as it pays to renege and re-optimize.
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Table 1 Functional forms
Aggregate production function,
H(Kt , Lt , Ft+Rt )
[
(1 − β)
(
AKαt (A
L
t Lt )
1−α)1−1/ϑ +β( Ft +Rtσ )1−1/ϑ
] 1
1−1/ϑ
Extraction cost fossil energy, G(St ) γ1(S0/S)γ2
Generation renewable energy, b(Bt ) χ1+χ2e−χ3Bt
Table 2 Key ethical and economic baseline parameter values
ρ η A α β θ δ K0
1%/year 1/2 3.78 0.35 0.06 1/2 10%/year 200$T
AL0 σ γ 1 γ 2 χ1 χ2 χ3 L0
1 0.15 0.35 1 0.563 0.375 0.00375 6.5
III. the second-best optimal renewable subsidy with pre-commitment, also called the rules
outcome (short-dashed lines);
IV. BAU with no carbon tax or renewable subsidy (dot-dashed lines).
In our simulations time runs from 2010 till 2600 and is measured in years.15 The func-
tional forms and calibration of the carbon cycle, temperature module and global warming
damages have been discussed in Sect. 2. We choose standard macroeconomic parameter
values for capital depreciation and intertemporal preferences and adopt assumptions on
near-term productivity and population growth from Nordhaus (2014). Current production
possibilities imply relatively low fossil fuel extraction costs and an initially high cost for
renewable energy generation due to past biases in innovation towards fossil energy pro-
duction. The calibration of our benchmark scenario reflects this cost structure. We report
the functional forms and baseline values of our model put forward in Sects. 3 and 4 for
key parameter in Tables 1, 2 and refer the reader to Appendix C for more calibration
details.
We use a CES production function and elasticity of substitution between energy and the
capital-labour aggregate ofϑ=0.5. This determines the price elasticity of energy demand. The
fossil fuel extraction cost function in Tables 1, 2 implies that the elasticity of abandoned fossil
fuel reserves, S(T ) = S0
[
(b(BT ) − υ(T )) /γ1
]−1/γ2 , with respect to the cost of renewable
energy equals 1/γ2 = 1. This figure can be interpreted as the price elasticity of fossil fuel
supply, which we will return to in section 5.5.
5.1 First Best: How to Quickly De-carbonize and Leave More Fossil Fuel
Untapped
Under the first-best scenario I (see the solid lines) consumption, GDP and the capital stock
monotonically increase. The transition to renewable energy takes place smoothly as soon as
15 The problem is solved numerically with the optimization solver CONOPT3 in GAMS.We solve the model
in finite time. The turnpike property ensures that all equilibrium paths approach the steady state quickly such
that it renders terminal conditions essentially unimportant. In contrast to the first best, the second best needs
additional constraints for market equilibrium and private sector behaviour.
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Fig. 1 Policy simulations. Key first best (solid lines), second-best subsidy: discretion (long-dashed lines),
BAU (dot-dashed line), second-best subsidy: rules (short-dashed lines). (Color figure online)
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Table 3 Transition times and carbon budget
Fossil fuel only Renewable only Carbon used
I First best 2010–2037 2041– 320 GtC
II Second-best subsidy: no commitment (discretion) 2010–2076 2083– 1080 GtC
III Second-best subsidy: commitment (rules) 2010–2035 2040– 345 GtC
IV Business as usual 2010–2176 2177– 2500 GtC
Table 4 Global carbon taxes, renewable subsidies, and welfare losses
Welfare loss
(% of GDP)
Maximum carbon
tax τ ($/tC)
Maximum renewable
subsidy ($/tC)
Peak T
(◦C)
I First best 0% 175 $/GtC 350 $/GtC 2.1
II Second-best subsidy: no
commitment
−95% N/A 360 $/GtC 3.5
III Second-best subsidy:
commitment
−6% N/A 510 $/GtC 2.2
IV Business as usual −598% N/A N/A 5.1
2037; fossil energy is phased out completely by 2041 (see Table 3). Over this period 320 GtC
are burnt, so most of the 4000 GtC of fossil fuel reserves are abandoned. Table 4 shows that
this leads to a peak warming of only 2.1 ◦C or a maximum atmospheric carbon stock of 970
GtC [from (3)], which is close to the maximum of a trillion tons of carbon argued for in Allen
et al. (2009).16 This rapid and unambiguous first-best transformation towards a carbon-free
economy is achieved through the implementation of a carbon tax and a renewable subsidy
policy. Both follow an inverted U-shaped time profile. The global carbon tax starts at 109 $/tC
or 30 $/tCO2 and reaches a maximum of 175 $/tC or 48 $/tCO2 at the end of the fossil era,
after which the tax falls and becomes obsolete as learning in renewables reduces their cost.
The renewable subsidy starts at 350 $/tC or 95$/tCO2 in the first period of renewable use
and rapidly falls to zero as all learning has occurred by the end of this century. The optimal
policy mix, therefore, combines a quick and aggressive subsidy to phase in renewable energy
quite early on and a carbon tax which gradually rises and falls to depress fossil energy use
until renewable energy sources are competitive.
5.2 Business as Usual and Markov-Perfect Second-Best Policies
In the business as usual scenario IV (see the dot-dashed lines) both externalities remain uncor-
rected. As a result the economy uses much more fossil fuel: 2500 GtC in total. Global mean
temperature increases by a maximum of 5.1 ◦C matching recent IPCC and IEA estimates for
business as usual. The transition to renewable energy occursmuch later, in 2176, and abruptly.
The reason is that climate benefits of renewable energy and learning go unnoticed and are
not fully internalized by the market. The impacts of the climate and learning externalities are
large enough to drastically change accumulation paths as temperatures rise. This can be seen
16 Recent estimates by the IPCC (2014) state that cumulative emissions have to be limited to 790 GtC (with
an uncertainty range of 700-860 GtC) if global warming is to remain below 2 ◦C. By 2011 520 GtC had been
emitted, giving a remaining carbon budget of only 270 GtC.
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in the “kinks” in the business-as-usual paths in Fig. 1 and is also reflected in the substantial
welfare loss of about 6 times initial GDP.17 Failure to introduce climate policies induces a
very long period of fossil fuel extraction leading to high cumulative carbon emissions and
high global warming damages. Damages under business as usual are large enough to lower
factor returns sufficiently to induce decumulation of capital and a fall in consumption. From
2140-2190 the capital stock falls by 25% from a peak of $410 trillion to a trough $310 trillion,
consumption drops by 17% from a peak of $107 trillion to a trough of $88 trillion. Once
extraction costs rise above the cost of renewable energy, the fossil fuel era comes to an end.
As the economy switches to renewable energy and stocks of atmospheric carbon recede, the
return to capital, the interest rate and investment increase.
Failure to reach an international climate agreement on pricing carbon throughout the world
or the political infeasibility of carbon taxes might lead to the implementation of a second-best
renewable subsidy. Without commitment such a subsidy delays the transition by about 40
years (long-dashed red lines). The subsidy starts at a similar level as under first-best but the
delayed transition increases total carbon use to 1080GtC (less than half of BAU but still 3 to 4
times the optimal carbon budget) and increases peak temperature significantly to 3.5 ◦C. The
reduction of the carbon budget relative to BAU is, however, associated with a weak Green
Paradox effect (Sinn 2008) in the absence of a correcting carbon tax, because fossil fuel use
increases above BAU levels albeit for a shorter period (see Fossil Fuel Use panel in Fig. 1).18
In the long run more carbon is locked up in the crust of the earth than under BAU. As a result
of this, welfare is higher than under BAU and there is no strong Green Paradox effect. The
cost of second-best is significant as welfare falls by 95% compared to the first best, but this
fall is substantially less than the fall of almost 6 times initial GDP under BAU.
5.3 Second-Best Renewable Subsidy with Pre-commitment and Time
Inconsistency
To facilitate comparison with Kalkuhl et al. (2013), we also indicate in Fig. 1 (see the short-
dashed lines) the effects of second-best optimal renewable subsidies when pre-commitment
is feasible. It is clear from the simulations that with pre-commitment the renewable subsidy is
pushed above the SBL as this brings forward the carbon-free era by more than four decades
relative to the case without commitment and close to the first-best timing (from 2083 to
2040). It also locks up more fossil fuel in the crust of the earth. There is some acceleration
of global warming in the short run arising from the weak Green Paradox effect, but more
fossil fuel is locked up in the long run and therefore cumulative emissions and peak global
warming are cut down (from 1080 to 345 GtC and from 3.5 to 2.2 ◦C). Although carbon
emissions are higher by 25 GtC and global mean temperature by 0.1 ◦C relative to the first-
best outcome, this is exclusively due to short-run weak Green Paradox effects. In the absence
of carbon taxation, fossil fuel prices are depressed relative to BAU under the second-best
subsidy for renewable energy as global warming is forced down to a figure that is very close
to the first-best outcome. To mimic the first-best outcome while having to accept somewhat
higher fossil fuel use during the fossil era, renewable energy needs to be phased in earlier
than first-best. These inefficiencies are relatively small and welfare falls by less than 6%
17 Stern (2007) expresses cost of inaction in annuity terms; Nordhaus (2008) in terms of today’s consumption.
We calculate the difference in the total welfare, evaluated at initial prices, and express it as a share of initial
GDP. Our welfare measure equals the loss due to inaction as a share of initial GDP.
18 Under Leontief production technology, there are no Green Paradox effects as the energy demand is a fixed
proportion of output.
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relative to the first-best outcome, which is a lot less than the loss of 95% of initial GDP if
pre-commitment to future climate policies is infeasible.
Alas, the pledges of policymakers regarding the second-best optimal policywith commitment
are not credible if commitment breaks down and there is an incentive to deviate from the
initial policy announcement later on. To illustrate this time inconsistency, we give policy
makers the option to re-optimize after 25 years. This leaves only 5 years of fossil fuel use
and 55 GtC to be burnt. Policy makers renege on their announcements by subscribing to
more ambitious climate targets: the subsidy for renewable energy is increased by almost
10% to 50 $/tC and as a result cumulative carbon emissions are depressed by nearly 15 GtC
as the linkage to the weak Green Paradox effect with higher fossil fuel use in the first 25
years is severed. In choosing to surprise private agents by pushing up subsidies for renewable
energy, expectations are falsified and welfare is increased by 0.1% and peak temperature is
lowered by a tiny amount (0.03 ◦C) relative to the second-best outcomes. This occurs at the
expense of a tiny additional weak Green Paradox effect. This illustrates that, in the absence
of a credible and effective commitment mechanism, the second-best renewable subsidies
calculated under the assumption are pre-commitment are likely to be reneged on and are
thus time inconsistent. If pre-commitment cannot be guaranteed, the second-best renewable
energy subsidies calculated under the assumption of no pre-commitment and discussed in
Sect. 5.2 will be relevant as they are credible and time consistent albeit at the expense of lower
welfare and higher peak warming. Our results demonstrate the importance of commitment
devices in climate policy.
5.4 Time Paths for the Market Price of Fossil Fuel and Renewable Energy
The weak Green Paradox effects are best seen when plotting the market prices of energy,
depicted in Fig. 2. The price of fossil energy consists of the sum of marginal extraction cost
and the Hotelling rent plus any carbon tax [see Eq. (10a)]. The market price of renewable
energy is set to its production cost minus any learning subsidy [see Eq. (10b)]. Initially prices
are rising in all scenarios and only on these rising sections are fossil fuels used. The solid
black line gives the initial cost of renewable energy.
First, consider the business as usual scenario IV (see the dot-dashed line) where the carbon
tax and the subsidy are set to zero. The market cost of renewable energy is above the market
price of fossil energy and constant without any learning by doing through learning by doing
from past production and/or subsidy. Fossil fuel is in use initially and its price rises due to
increasing extraction costs and the increasing Hotelling rents. As extraction costs approach
the back-stop price, the fossil fuel era draws to an end and the Hotelling rent falls. This fall
in the Hotelling rent mitigates rising extraction costs and prolongs the era of fossil fuel use.
In its final period, the scarcity value reaches zero and extraction costs equal renewable unit
costs. After this switch point, the cost of fossil energy, consisting now only of the extraction
cost component, remains constant. Due to learning by doing, the cost of producing renewable
energy falls quickly and approaches its lower floor.
With a second-best subsidy without commitment, scenario II (see the long-dashed line), the
market price of energy falls below its business-as-usual level as fossil fuel owners anticipate
that their resources will beworth less in the future. Lowermarket prices temporarily stimulate
higher fossil fuel use (of up to 28%), faster extraction, and acceleration of global warming.
Once the SBL is sufficiently high to make fossil fuel uncompetitive, renewable energy is
produced and energy prices start to fall as past learning lowers production costs.
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Fig. 2 The market prices of
energy during the transition
($/tC). Key first best (solid lines),
second-best subsidy: discretion
(long-dashed lines), BAU
(dot-dashed line), second-best
subsidy: rules (short-dashed
lines). (Color figure online)
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First best policy, scenario I (see the solid line), precludes the weak Green Paradox effect by
setting a carbon tax which equals the SCC. This lifts energy prices above BAU levels initially.
The tax allows enables an earlier transition to renewable energy.
The second-best subsidy with pre-commitment, scenario III (see the short-dashed line) com-
pensates for the missing carbon tax by increasing the renewable energy subsidy beyond the
SBL. Energy prices are lower initially and kept lower for longer as the subsidy prices fossil
energy out of the market to ensure learning makes renewable energy competitive even as the
subsidy recedes.
5.5 Robustness of Optimal Climate Policy
Table 5 shows the sensitivity of all policy scenarios to key parameter values. It can be shown
analytically that a higher price elasticity of energy demand and a lower price elasticity of
fossil fuel reserves increase themagnitude of theGreen Paradox effect and thus strengthen the
importance of the ability to commit (van der Ploeg 2016). To illustrate this, we first increase
the elasticity of substitution between energy and the other inputs in the aggregate production
function from ϑ = 0.5 to 1 as this corresponds to a higher price elasticity of energy demand.
The higher price elasticity allows substitution away from fossil fuel in each period, so in the
first-best scenario less carbon is used although the transition occurs later. The decrease in
fossil fuel consumption also delays the climate crisis and ameliorates the fall in consumption
so that the welfare loss under BAU falls considerably relative to the baseline case of less
substitutability. The substitutability of fossil fuel, however, heightens the short-run Green
Paradox effects and the welfare loss under commitment increase in absolute terms and under
the absence of commitment relative to BAU.
In contrast, we also increase the convexity of extraction costs by increasing γ2from 1 to 2
and thereby lower the price elasticity of final fossil fuel reserves from 1 to 0.5. This severely
limits the economic viability of fossil fuels and reduces the carbon budget by as much as one
third relative to the baseline calibration. Lower cumulative fossil fuel lowers the Hotelling
rent and now limits the Green Paradox effect. The value of commitment, measured in the
welfare reduction in the loss of commitment, falls almost by one half.
We also present simulations for variations in the rate of productivity growth and the pure
time preference. Lowering productivity growth makes climate policy more ambitious (with
an intertemporal inequality aversion greater than 1) as future generations will have lower
material well-being and lower levels of climate damage are justified. The carbon budgets and
peak warming relative to baseline do not change significantly, however, as fossil fuel is used
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at a lower rate for longer. A higher rate of pure time preference increases the consumption
discount rate which makes climate policy less ambitious and lowers the social cost of carbon.
Peak warming and the carbon budget increase significantly to 2.8 ◦C and 677 GtC. The
consumption discount rate, however, also lowers the trend growth rate of the economy and
ameliorates the problems of the climate externality and commitment.
6 Conclusion
Our integrated assessment of climate change and Ramsey growth highlights the costs associ-
ated with second-best climate policies which apply when policy makers fail to price carbon.
While the first-best climate policy prices carbon and subsidizes renewable use to curb fos-
sil fuel use, promote substitution away from fossil fuel towards renewable energy sources,
increase untapped fossil fuel, and bring forward the carbon-free era, we show that second-
best policy has significant costs in terms of welfare and peak warming. The first-best policy
mix limits the total amount of carbon burnt to 320 GtC and peak warming to 2.1 ◦C, whereas
under the Markov-perfect second-best policy 1080 GtC are burnt and temperature rises by as
much as 3.5 ◦C. The associated welfare loss amounts to nearly today’s world GDP compared
to a welfare loss of almost 6 times today’s world GDP under business as usual which sees
global warming rise to 5.1 ◦C as the total amount of carbon burnt is much higher (2500 GtC).
A subsidy to renewable energy without taxing fossil fuel encourages higher fossil fuel use
in the short run (up to 30% above fossil fuel use under business as usual), but locks up more
carbon and curbs cumulative carbon emissions.
Previous studies on second-best climate policy have assumed, somewhat unrealistically, that
pre-commitment to announced policies by policy makers is possible, thus finding that the
absence of a carbon tax does not add significant welfare losses. Our results show that these
findings are due to the assumption of commitment which allows an energy transition that is
very close to the first best. Due weak Green Paradox effects, however, cumulative carbon
emissions increase by 25 to 345 GtC and peak warming to 2.3 ◦C. This slight increase in
temperature lowers welfare by 6% of initial GDP. Welfare is higher than under business as
usual (no strong Green Paradox effect), since the second-best optimal subsidy locks up more
carbon in the earth and limits peak global warming. However, the second-best policy is not
credible as it pays policy makers to renege and push up the renewable energy subsidy even
more after some time has lapsed.
Business as usual induces peak warming of 5.1 ◦C. The welfare loss without policy is almost
6 times today’s world GDP. Second-best renewable subsidies are, therefore, better than doing
nothing, but are insufficient to combat climate change. It is important that renewable subsidies
are complemented by a carbon tax to avoid excessive extraction in the short run associated
with theweakGreenParadox effect. If policymakers can pre-commit to announced renewable
subsidies, they can do better but they would have an incentive to renege and therefore such
announcements are not credible.
Our main message is that one has to be careful in taking second-best policies at face value,
when it turns out that they are derived under the assumption of credible commitment to
future policies. Such commitment to future climate policies is rarely seen which leads to
much less ambitious the second-best optimal climate policies. A crucial direction of research
for economists, lawyers, and political scientists interested in climate policy is to examine
how such commitment can be brought about. Fortunately, there is a voluminous literature
in macroeconomics and monetary economics to draw on. For example, Barro and Gordon
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(1983) show that, in an infinitely repeated game between policy makers and private agents,
sufficient reputation canbebuilt up for the policymakers not to renegeon their announcements
provided that the discount rate is not too high and punishments for deviating from the rules
outcome are high enough. If policy makers have insufficient reputation, they have to fall
back on the less attractive discretion outcome. More interesting is perhaps Rogoff’s (1985)
argument that the political process appoints a president of the central bank who is more
conservative (inflation averse) than the median (and pivotal) voter. Monetary economists
have long advocated that commitment to a sound monetary policy requires a clear and simple
mandate and an independent central bank. Adapting these arguments, Helm et al. (2003)
argue for a politically independent central carbon bank. Such a carbon bank should be free of
political influences, be given a clear mandate of ensuring that temperature will never exceed
2 ◦C, and be headed by a president committed to even more stringent policy. Such institutions
can help to build commitment to a credible climate policy.
Finally, we should make a caveat. Our IAM features perfect substitution between fossil fuel
and renewable energy. This leads to discrete phases of energy use, which thankfully makes
the calculation of the second-best policies with and without commitment relatively straight-
forward. Although this assumption gives clear insights into the levers of time-inconsistent
policies, when one has imperfect substitution between fossil fuel and renewable energy the
calculation of solving the second-best optimal policies without commitment requires solving
intricate dynamic programming problems.19 This is the challenge for future research.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source,
provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
7 Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
The adjoined Lagrangian for our model reads:
L ≡
∞∑
t=0
(1 + ρ)−t
[
LtUt (Ct/Lt ) − μSt (St+1 − St + Ft ) − μBt (Bt+1 − Bt − Rt )
]
+
∞∑
t=0
(1+ρ)−t
[
μPt (E
P
t+1−E Pt −ϕL Ft )+μTt
{
ETt+1−(1−ϕ)ETt −ϕ0(1−ϕL )Ft
}]
−
∞∑
t=0
(1 + ρ)−tλt
[
Kt+1−(1−δ)Kt −Z(E Pt +ETt )H(Kt , Lt , Ft + Rt )+G(St )Ft + b(Bt )Rt + Ct
]
,
where μSt denotes the shadow value of in-situ fossil fuel, μ
B
t the shadow value of learning by
doing, μPt and μ
T
t the shadow disvalue of the permanent and transient stocks of atmospheric
carbon, and λt the shadow value of manmade capital. Necessary conditions for a social opti-
19 One could make use of the sophisticated dynamic programming algorithms used in Lemoine and Traeger
(2014) and Lontzek et al. (2015), but these will require a lot of adaptation as the second-best Markov-perfect
optimization problem cannot be solved as a command optimum.
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mum are:
U ′(Ct/Lt ) = (Ct/Lt )−1/η = λt , (22a)
Zt HFt+Rt ≤G(St )+
[
μSt + ϕLμPt +ϕ0(1− ϕL)μTt
]
/λt , Ft ≥0, c.s., (22b)
Zt HFt +Rt ≤ b(Bt ) − μBt /λt , Rt ≥ 0, c.s., (22c)
(1 − δ + Zt+1HKt+1)λt+1 = (1 + ρ)λt , (22d)
μSt+1 = (1 + ρ)μSt + G ′(St+1)Ft+1λt+1, (22e)
μBt+1 = (1 + ρ)μBt − b′(Bt+1)Rt+1λt+1, (22f)
μPt+1 = (1 + ρ)μPt + Z ′(E Pt+1 + ETt+1)Ht+1λt+1, (22g)
(1 − ϕ)μTt+1 = (1 + ρ)μTt + Z ′(E Pt+1 + ETt+1)Ht+1λt+1. (22h)
Equations (22a) and (22d) yield the Euler Eq. (9). The Kuhn-Tucker conditions (22b)
and (22c) give (10a) and (10b) after defining θ St ≡ μSt /λt , θ Bt ≡ μBt /λt and θ Et ≡[
ϕLμ
P
t + ϕ0(1 − ϕL)μTt
]
/λt in final good units. (22e) and (22d) yield the Hotelling rule
θ St+1 = (1 + rt+1)θ St + G ′(St+1)Ft+1. (23)
Forward summation over time of (23) and using the transversality conditions gives (11).
Equations (22f) and (22d) yield
θ Bt+1 = (1 + rt+1)θ Bt + b′(Bt+1)Rt+1. (24)
Forward summation over time of (24) and using the transversality conditions yields (12).
Defining θ Pt ≡ μPt /λt and θTt ≡ μTt /λt in final good units we use (22g), (22h) and (22a) to
get:
θ Pt+1 = (1 + rt+1)θ Pt + Z ′(E Pt+1 + ETt+1)Ht+1, (25a)
(1 − ϕ)θTt+1 = (1 + rt+1)θTt + Z ′(E Pt+1 + ETt+1)Ht+1. (25b)
Solving (25a) and (25b), using the transversality conditions and θ Et ≡ ϕLθ Pt +ϕ0(1−ϕL)θTt ,
we obtain Eq. (13).
8 Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 4
The Lagrangian for the final phase of the second-best outcome is defined as
 ≡
∞∑
t=tR
(1 + ρ)−t Lt
[
(Ct/Lt )1−1/η − 1
1 − 1/η
]
+ λBt
[
Bt+1 − Bt + Yb(Bt )−υt (Et , Kt , Lt , ., b(Bt ) − υt )
]
+ λKt
[
Kt+1 − Kt − Y (Et , Kt , Lt , ., b(Bt ) − υt )
+ Ct − υt Yb(Bt )−υt (Et , Kt , Lt , ., b(Bt ) − υt )
]
+μCt
[
Ct+1 −
(
1 + YKt+1(Et+1, Kt+1, Lt+1, ., b(Bt+1) − υt+1)
1 + ρ
)η ( Lt+1
Lt
)
Ct
]
,
(26)
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where tC F denotes the start of the final carbon-free phase. The optimality conditions for this
phase are
d
dυt
=
(
λKt υt − λBt
)
Yqt ,qt + ημCt−1YKt ,qt
(
1 + rt
1 + ρ
)η−1 ( Lt
Lt−1
)
Ct−1 = 0, (27a)
d
d Bt
= (1 + ρ)λBt−1 − λBt
+
[
λBt Yqt,qt + λKt (Rt − υt Yqt ,qt )
− ημCt−1YKt ,qt
(
1 + rt
1 + ρ
)η−1 ( Lt
Lt − 1
)
Ct−1
]
b′(Bt ) = 0, (27b)
d
d Kt
= λBt YKt ,qt + (1 + ρ)λKt−1 − λKt (1 + rt + υt YKt ,qt )
− ημCt−1YKt ,Kt
(
1 + rt
1 + ρ
)η−1 ( Lt
Lt−1
)
Ct−1 = 0. (27c)
d
dCt
= (Ct/Lt )−1/η+λKt +(1 + ρ)μCt−1 − μCt
(
1 + rt+1
1 + ρ
)η ( Lt+1
Lt
)
= 0. (27d)
One can verify that the optimalMarkov-perfect second-best renewable subsidy is time consis-
tent in thefinal phase byverifying that a solution to (18), (19) and (21) exists ifμCt = 0, t ≥ 0.
Let us suppose this is the case, We then get from (27a) that υt = λBt /λKt ,so tha (27b)
gives (1 + ρ)λBt−1 = λBt + λKt b′(Bt )Rt and (27c) gives (1 + ρ)λKt−1 = λKt (1 + rt+1).
Equation (27d) yields Lt (Ct/Lt )1−1/η + λKt = 0, which together with the last condition
yields the Euler equation (19a). We also have (1 + ρ)υt−1λKt−1 = υtλKt + λKt b′(Bt )Rt or
υt = (1 + rt+1)υt−1 − +b′(Bt )Rt , which indeed yields (20) and is the same as (12).
Using a similar procedure, one show that the Markov-perfect renewable phase during the
phase were fossil fuel and renewable energy are used alongside each other is given by the
same expression for the SBL.
9 Appendix C: Functional Forms and Calibration
Our model runs on an annual instead of decadal time grid as earlier integrated assessment
models or semi-decadal as in Nordhaus (2014). This allows us to pinpoint much more accu-
rately the transition times towards the carbon-free era and a coarse time grid has been shown
to introduce significant numerical biases (Cai et al. 2012).
9.1 Preferences
We have CES utility and set the elasticity of intertemporal substitution to η = 1/2 and thus
intergenerational inequality aversion to 2. The rate of pure time preference ρ is 1% per year.
9.2 Cost of energy
We employ an extraction technology of the form G(S) = γ1(S0/S)γ2 ,where γ1 and γ2 are
positive constants. This specification implies that reserves will not be fully be extracted;
some fossil fuel remains untapped in the crust of the earth. Extraction costs are calibrated to
give an initial share of energy in GDP between 6–7% depending on the policy scenario. This
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translates to fossil production costs of $350/tC ($35/barrel of oil), where we take one barrel
of oil to be equivalent to 1/10 ton of carbon, giving G(S0) = γ1 = 0.35. The IEA (2008)
long-term cost curve for oil extraction gives a doubling to quadrupling of the extraction cost
of oil if another 1000 GtC are extracted. Since we are considering all carbon-based energy
sources (not only oil) which are more abundant and cheaper to extract, we assume only a
doubling of production costs if a total 2000 GtC is extracted. With S0 = 4000GtC,20 this
gives γ2 = 1.21 This implies that we assume very low extraction costs and a high initial stock
of reserves which biases our findings toward using more fossil fuel longer.
9.3 Initial capital stock and depreciation rate
The initial capital stock is set to 200 (US$ trillion), which is taken from Rezai et al. (2012).
We set the depreciation rate δ to be 0.1 per year.
9.4 Global production and global warming damages
Output before damages is
Ht =
[
(1 − β)
(
AK αt (A
L
t Lt )
1−α)1−1/ϑ + β( Ft + Rt
σ
)1−1/ϑ
] 1
1−1/ϑ
,
ϑ ≥ 0, 0 < α < 1and0 < β < 1.
This is a constant-returns-to scale CES production function in energy and a capital-
labour composite with θ the elasticity of substitution and β the share the parameter
for energy. The capital-labour composite is defined by a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-
Douglas function with α the share of capital, A total factor productivity andALt the efficiency
of labour. The two types of energy are perfect substitutes in production. Damages are
calibrated so that they give the same level of global warming damages for the initial lev-
els of output and mean temperature. We rewrite production before damages as Ht =
H0
[
(1 − β)
(
AK αt (A
L
t Lt )
1−α
H0
)1−1/ϑ + β
(
Ft +Rt
σ H0
)1−1/ϑ] 11−1/ϑ
. We set the share of capital
to α = 0.35, the energy share parameter to β = 0.06, and the elasticity of factor substitution
ϑ = 0.5 (as in the WITCH 2008 model) which we will refer to as the CES run. Initial world
GDP in 2010 is $63 trillion. Given AL1 = 1, we calibrate A = 3.78 to yield initial output
under “laissez faire”. The energy intensity of output σ is calibrated to an initial energy use
of 9,5 GtC under “laissez faire”, σ = 0.15.
9.5 Population growth and labour-augmenting technical progress
Population in 2010 (L1) is 6.5 billion people. FollowingNordhaus (2008) andUNprojections
population growth is given byLt = 8.6−2.1e−0.35t . Population growth starts at 1% per year
and falls below 0.1% percent within six decades and flattens out at 8.6 billion people. In the
sensitivity analysis in Sect. 4.3 we assume faster growth and a higher plateau to reflect more
recent forecasts. Without loss of generality the efficiency of labourALt = 3 − 2e−0.2t starts
20 Stocks of carbon-based energy sources are notoriously hard to estimate. IPCC (2007) assumes in its A2-
scenario that 7000 GtCO2 (with 3.66 tCO2 per tC this equals 1912 GtC) will be burnt with a rising trend this
century alone. We roughly double this number to get our estimate of 4000 GtC for initial fossil fuel reserves.
Nordhaus (2008) assumes an upper limit for carbon-based fuel of 6000 GtC in the DICE-07.
21 Since G(2000)/G(4000) = (4000/2000)γ2 = 2γ2 and 2γ2 = 2.
123
A. Rezai, F. van der Ploeg
out with AL1 = 1and an initial Harrod-neutral rate of technical progress of 2% per year. The
efficiency of labour stabilizes at 3 times its current level.
9.6 Cost of the renewable and learning by doing
We model learning by doing with initial cost reductions and a lower limit for the cost of the
renewable, i.e., b(Bt ) = χ1 + χ2e−χ3Bt , χ1, χ2, χ3 ≥ 0. This formulation differs from the
usual power law definition of learning curves (Manne and Richels 2004) but allows us to
better calibrate initial learning rates (which can reach infinity for power law) and specify a
lower limit for unit cost. We calibrate unit cost of renewable energy to the percentage of GDP
necessary to generate all energy demand from renewables. Under a Leontief technology,
with ϑ → 0, energy demand is σ Zt Ht . The cost of generating all energy carbon free is
σ Zt Ht b/Zt Ht = σbt . Nordhaus (2008) states that it costs 5.6% of GDP to decarbonize
today’s economy in a model of back-stop mitigation. We increase this cost to 7–8% of
GDP in order to reach the learning potential given below. To calibrate the production cost
of renewable energy, this cost estimate needs to be combined with the cost of producing
conventional energywhich ranges between6 and7%.This givesσb1 = 0.14orwithσ = 0.15
we get b1 = b(0) = χ1 + χ2 = 0.94 or $940/tC. Through learning by doing this cost can
be reduced by 60% to a lower limit of 9% of GDP, so that b(∞) = χ1 = 0.563 and thus
χ2 = 0.375. In our simulations with ϑ > 0,this lower limit falls to about 6% of GDP
due to substitution of energy through capital, i.e. in the long run the share of energy falls
back to its current level. We assume that experience in renewable production lowers unit
cost at a falling rate and the parameter χ3measures this speed of learning. We calibrate
learning such that costs would decrease slowly. We suppose a mere 1.25% reduction in cost
if all of world energy use would be supplied by renewable sources in the initial period, so
that χ3 = 0.00375. These assumptions imply at most a 14% reduction for a doubling of
experience at the peak of learning-by-doing and fall within the broad range reported for
learning rates in renewable generation (McDonald and Schrattenholzer, 2001). Manne and
Richels (2004) use a 20% cost reduction for a doubling of experience (and thus need to
impose unrealistic constraints on renewable use due to the strong curvature of the power-law
learning curve). Alberth and Hope (2007) assume a cost reduction of 5–25% for a doubling
of experience so our calibrated 14% falls in this range. Goulder and Mathai (2000) calibrate
their learning-by-doing technology to a 0.5–4% of GDP cost of a 25% emission reduction
in 2020. This translates into a cost of renewable energy which is a factor 3–8 times current
fossil energy prices. In our calibration current renewable production prices are little less
than 3 times those of fossil energy. These numbers illustrate the large scientific uncertainties
surrounding the possible trajectories of renewable energy prices. Our calibration falls within
the ballpark figures presented above, providing higher costs relative to Nordhaus (2008) who
also considers potential CCS technologies in his assessment.
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